NLRB Craft Severance Policies: Preeminence of the Bargaining History Factor After Mallinckrodt by Abodeely, John E
Boston College Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 2
3-1-1970
NLRB Craft Severance Policies: Preeminence of
the Bargaining History Factor After Mallinckrodt
John E. Abodeely
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John E. Abodeely, NLRB Craft Severance Policies: Preeminence of the Bargaining History Factor After
Mallinckrodt, 11 B.C.L. Rev. 411 (1970), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol11/iss3/2
NLRB CRAFT SEVERANCE POLICIES: PREEMINENCE OF
THE BARGAINING HISTORY FACTOR
AFTER MALLINCKRODT
JOHN E. ABODEELY*
Under Section 9(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, the agent selected by a majority of the employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees in that unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.' Section
9(b) of the Act empowers the National Labor Relations Board to
determine the appropriate unit:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order
to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employee unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof .... 2
The entrustment to the NLRB of the right to designate appro-
priate bargaining units has created numerous problems. One of the
most controversial and complex problems is the choice which the
Board often is required to make between a craft and an industrial
unit. Unlike most unit determination cases, it involves the overt con-
flict between employee interest groups.
The various skilled craft groups have raised a number of cogent
arguments in favor of separate representation. First, being a minority
in an industrial unit creates the feeling among craftsmen that their
particular interests are being ignored. Second, the high degree of skill
possessed by these "labor aristocrats" provides their representatives
with greater economic bargaining power, thus allowing them to com-
mand higher wages and benefits for members of the unit. The mixing
of skilled and unskilled employees tends to dilute this bargaining
power, thereby lessening the benefits which the employer is willing to
offer. On the other hand, the industrial unions forcefully argue that
separate bargaining units jeopardize the rights of all employees, in that
a strike by the skilled workers could effectively shut down the em-
ployer's entire operations. Industrial unions also argue that the larger
unit enhances their bargaining power with employers. Further, it is
claimed that the separation of employees into different units leads to
* B.S., 1965; LLB., 1968, Boston University ; Member, Massachusetts Bar, Instructor
in Business Law and Research Associate of the Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School
of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
2 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
411
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
competitive animosity with the concomitant disruption of industrial
harmony.
The employers involved in these craft disputes usually concur in
the position taken by the industrial unions. First, it is felt that bar-
gaining with one unit is less formidable than dealing with two or more
units. Second, employers fear bargaining separately with several dif-
ferent unions, particularly when each union possesses the power to
disrupt their entire operations.
Because of these diverse and often competing interests, it has been
particularly difficult for the NLRB to formulate a policy which recog-
nizes these interests as well as the interest of the public in maintaining
labor stability. This difficulty has been reflected in the decisions of the
Board during the past thirty-five years, a period during which the
Board has unsuccessfully attempted to balance these interests in a
way which would effectuate the broad policies of the Act. The purpose
of this article is to examine the NLRB's past and present craft unit
policies and the application of these policies. This, it is submitted, will
reveal an existing dichotomy between current Board policy and prac-
tice. While the Board has articulated a policy which professes to ex-
amine all relevant factors in the determination of an appropriate unit,
it has, in fact, emphasized only those factors which are supportive of
its apparent preference for the industrial unit.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act of
1935,3
 the subsequent, extended controversy involving the determina-
tion of the appropriate industrial or craft unit was not foreseen. It was
generally assumed that the American Federation of Labor's (AFL)
policy of recognizing craft units would alleviate this problem' How-
3 29	 §§ 151-66 (1964).
4
 From the late 1800s until the mid 1930s, the AFL was concerned only with
organizing the skilled labor force. It was not until after enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act in 1935 that the craft versus industrial unit conflict surfaced. During
1936 and 1937, the then Committee for Industrial Organization conducted a spectacular
organizing drive in the mass production industries. Shortly thereafter, in May, 1938, the
Committee transformed itself into the Congress of Industrial Organizations and pledged
itself to the advancement of industrial unionism. After an attempt to unite the organiza-
tions failed, the nation found itself in the midst of a war for control of the labor force.
This conflict resulted in modification of the objectives of both labor organizations and the
placement of substantial burdens upon the NLRB. One labor historian has noted:
The government became involved through the NLRB, which was inevitably
called upon to settle the problems of proper bargaining units in industry after
industry. Even under peaceful conditions its task was not an easy one since the
CIO claimed all employees regardless of what work they did and the AFL
claimed all men who accomplished any task however faintly it resembled a
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ever, during the first few cases before the Board, there developed a
noticeable trend toward favoring the larger integrated industrial units
over the smaller craft units.° In 1937 the Board modified this position
and instituted a policy which granted self-determination elections to
craft units during the period of initial organization.6 Under this policy
the employees in the craft were allowed, when all other factors were
"evenly balanced," to choose in an election between the union contend-
ing for the comprehensive unit and the union contending for the craft
unit.?
A. The American Can Doctrine
In American Can Co.8 the Board was confronted for the first time
with a situation in which there had been an earlier determination in
favor of an industrial bargaining unit. In dismissing the petition for
severance a majority of the Board stated:
The Board is not authorized by the Act to split the appro-
priate unit thus established by collective bargaining and em-
bodied in a valid exclusive bargaining contract.°
This decision established a Board policy of denying craft severance
where there existed a stable history of collective bargaining. From 1939
to 1947 the Board generally continued to adhere to its decision in
American Can and to deny most severance requests. 1° In the early
craft. In the midst of bitter conflict the work of the NLRB became much
more difficult.
J. Rayback, A History of American Labor 363 (1966). See also J. Winfrey, The Appro-
priate Bargaining Unit Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board 141-51 (1965).
a See, e.g., Portland Gas & Coke Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 552, 1 L.R.R.M. 10 (1937) ;
S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 1 L.R.R.M. 29 (1936).
6 Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 1A L.R.R.M. 122 (1937).
The NLRB's determination of the appropriate unit for collective bargaining arises in
the context of either an initial organization or a craft severance. Craft severance is "a
process by which a group of skilled workers, recognized as a definable craft group, splits
off from the union representing both themselves and a larger group of less skilled workers
in order to establish a separate craft unit." Memoranda of the Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress, March 20, 1968, reported in Daily Labor Report No. 39
(Feb. 27, 1969).
7 Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 300, 1A L.R.R.M. 122, 126 (1937).
The use of these "Globe" elections was heavily criticized by Board Member Edwin
Smith. Member Smith argued that by allowing minorities to vote for separate repre-
sentation, the Board disregarded the interests of the majority and magnified the risk of
strikes by powerful craft units which could effectively shut down an entire operation.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 159, 175-77, 1A L.R.R.M. 275, 280-81 (1937).
8 13 N.L.R.B. 1252, 4 L.R.R.M. 392 (1939).
0 Id. at 1256, 4 L.R.R.M. at 394.
3.0 See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 280, 6 L.R.R.M. 307 (1940) (toll
maintenance employees denied separate unit) ; Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, Inc., 18 N.L.R.B.
973, 5 L.R.R.M. 460 (1939) (9 craft groups denied separate units) ; West Coast Wood
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1940s, however, the Board developed the "craft-identity" exception to
the American Can doctrine. Under this exception craft severance could
be granted where the craft had maintained its separate identity, in
spite of its inclusion in an industrial unit. The Board articulated this
"craft-identity" exception in the General Electric Co.' case.
[1]The group must demonstrate that it is a true craft, [2]
that it has not been a mere dissident faction but has main-
tained its identity as a craft group throughout the period of
bargaining upon a more comprehensive unit basis, and [3]
that it has protested inclusion in the more comprehensive
unit . . . 12
Eventually the Board liberalized its "craft-identity" exception
and, in some cases, granted severance even where the craft had not
satisfied the third test—protestation against inclusion in the larger
unit."
B. Section 9(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act
Despite the increased use of the "craft-identity" exception, the
American Can doctrine was bitterly protested by the AFL. In response
to the AFL's appeal for remedial action, Congress enacted Section
(b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act. It was provided therein
that
the Board shall not . . . decide that any craft unit is inap-
propriate for [collective bargaining] on the ground that a
different unit has been established by a prior Board de-
termination, unless a majority of the employees in the pro-
posed craft unit vote against separate representation . . . . 14
The legislative history of this amendment reveals the existence of a
widespread feeling that the American Can doctrine, even as modified
by the "craft-identity" exception, effectively precluded craftsmen from
exercising the free choice guaranteed by the Act.'
Preserving Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 1, 5 L.R.R.M. 104 (1939) (boommen and rafters denied
separate units).
11 58 N.L.R.B. 57, 15 L.R.R.M. 33 (1944).
12 Id. at 59, 15 L.R.R.M. at 33. The Board further noted that "[a]s an alternative
[to the craft identity exception], a craft group may show that the production and
maintenance unit was established without its knowledge, or that there has been no
previous consideration of the merits of a separate unit." Id.
13 See, e.g., Allied Chem.	 Dye Corp., 71 N.L.R.B. 1217, 19 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1946) ;
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 71 N.L.R.B. 878, 19 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1946).
14 29 § 159(b) (2) (1964). The procedure for determining the appropriate-
ness of a craft unit under § 9(b) (2) is outlined in detail in § 9(c) of the Act and in the
NLRB's Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17-.21 (1969).
16 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947).
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After enactment of section 9(b) (2), officials of the Congress of
Industrial Organization (CIO) asserted that the provision would allow
craft groups to obtain severance regardless of the consequences to the
more comprehensive unit. This fear proved unfounded, for one year
after this enactment the Board decided the National Tube Co." case
in which it rendered its first interpretation of section 9(b) (2).
C. The National Tube Doctrine
In National Tube Co. the petitioner requested severance of cer-
tain bricklayers who had been part of a production and maintenance
unit. In dismissing the petition the Board reasoned that section 9(b)
only prohibited using a prior unit determination as the sole basis for
disallowing craft severance." It maintained that a history of stable
collective bargaining could still be used as a factor in determining the
propriety of the requested severance." Applying these principles to
the facts in National Tube, the Board held that the high degree of
functional integration when combined with the history of successful
industry bargaining in the basic steel industry constituted an over-
whelming argument in favor of the more comprehensive unit?
In each of the three years from 1948 through 1950, the NLRB re-
affirmed its interpretation of section 9(b) (2) and extended the Na-
tional Tube doctrine to other industries. Thus the denial of craft
severance was extended to the wet milling, 20 lumber, 21 and aluminum'
industries which, like basic steel, were characterized by both highly
integrated production methods and a stable history of collective bar-
gaining.
D. The American Potash Doctrine
It was not until 1954 in the American Potash & Chem. Corp. 23
case that National Tube's "integration of operations" theory was
seriously challenged. In a three-to-two decision, the Board again re-
viewed the legislative history of section 9(b) (2) and concluded that
the right of separate representation should not be denied the
members of a craft group merely because they are employed
in an industry which involves highly integrated production
processes and in which the prevailing pattern of bargaining
18 76 N.L.B.R. 1199, 21 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1948).
17 Id. at 1205, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
18
 Id. at 1205-06, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
19 Id. at 1207-08, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1295.
20 Corn Products Ref. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362, 23 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1948).
21 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076, 25 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1949).
22 Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804, 26 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1950).
23 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 33 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1954).
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is industrial in character. We shall, therefore, not extend the
practice of denying craft severance on an industry-wide
basis."
Although rejecting the use of functional integration and a history of
industry bargaining as a basis for denying craft severance, the Board
refused to upset the application of the "integration of operations"
theory in the National Tube industries (basic steel, lumber, aluminum
and wet milling) because it was not deemed "wise or feasible" to upset
patterns of bargaining which had become firmly established after Na-
tional Tube."
Under the NLRB's new interpretation of section 9(b) (2), the
principle was established that a self-determination election should be
granted where the petitioning union can meet a dual burden of proof:
"(1) the departmental group is functionally distinct and separate and
(2) the petitioner is a union which has traditionally devoted itself to
serving the special interest of the employees in question.' The Ameri-
can Potash doctrine constituted a drastic change from National Tube
in that it greatly favored craft severance and effectively disregarded
the interests of the employer and the industrial union. 27 Despite this
apparent favoritism and the inconsistency of using a double standard
(one for the National Tube industries and a second for other indus-
tries), the Board's decision in American Potash was, with one excep-
tion," never seriously challenged.
24 Id. at 1421-22, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
25 Id. at 1422, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
26
 Id. at 1424, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1383. The majority explained:
If millions of employees today feel that their interests are better served by
craft unionism, it is not for us to say that they can only be represented on an
industrial basis or for that matter that they must bargain on strict craft lines.
All that we are considering here is whether two craft groups should have an
opportunity to decide the issue for themselves. We conclude that we must
afford them that choice in order to give effect to the statute.
Id. at 1422-23, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1382-83. Subsequent Board decisions established the
necessary elements of a "true craft," Diamond T. Utah, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 966, 44
L.R.R.M. 1563 (1959) ; International Harvester Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1709, 41 L.R.R.M.
1375 (1958) ; Reynolds Metals Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 821, 35 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1954), and of a
"traditional representative," Industrial Rayon Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 514, 46 L.R.R.M. 1345
(1960), enforcement denied, 291 F.2d 809, 48 L.R.R.M. 2484 (4th Cir. 1961).
27 See 107 N.L.R.B. at 1433, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1388 (dissenting opinion of Member
Peterson).
28
 This exception occurred in NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167,
44 L.R.R.M. 2855 (4th Cir. 1959). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit refused to enforce an order to bargain with a craft unit which had been deter-
mined appropriate pursuant to the American Potash rule.
The court criticized the NLRB's decision in American Potash on two grounds. First,
it maintained that the Board's new test effectively permitted the craft unit to determine
the issue of severance for itself, and thus constituted an abrogation of the Board's stat-
utory duty to determine the appropriate unit. Id. at 172, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2858. Further-
more, by applying a rule which disregards the interests of the plant or industrial unit, the
416
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Although the Board proclaimed that American Potash was only
a "new interpretation" of section 9(b) (2), it is submitted that the
Board which decided American Potash adopted a pro-craft unit philos-
ophy which was diametrically opposed to the earlier Board's pro-in-
dustrial unit philosophy. At the same time, however, the American
Potash Board was hesitant to overrule the deeply entrenched "integra-
tion of operations" theory. Thus, the Board attempted a political
compromise by allowing the National Tube industries to retain their
status while refusing to extend this privilege to other industries. The
NLRB, however, was undaunted by this criticism," for it was not until
1966 that the Board undertook a complete review of the policies
established in American Potash.
II. THE Mallinckrodt DOCTRINE
In December, 1966, the NLRB was presented with a petition
which requested severance of a group of instrument mechanics from
an existing production and maintenance unit. It was in this case, Mal-
linckrodt Chem. Works," that the Board instituted a major policy
change with respect to the craft severance issue. In a four-to-one
decision the Board rejected American Potash with regard to the stan-
dards developed therein and the favored treatment accorded the Na-
tional Tube industries.'
At the outset of its opinion the majority examined the employer's
operations—the manufacture of uranium metal—and concluded that it
constituted a highly integrated process which was dependent upon a
continuous flow system 3 2 Then, using the first of the American Potash
Board will frequently arrive at results which will be arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus
subject to reversal by the courts. Id. at 174, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2860.
Second, the court held that the result was in fact arbitrary and discriminatory in
the case at bar because the flat glass industry is indistinguishable from the National
Tube industries in which, even after American Potash, the Board has persisted in
denying severance by applying a different rule. Id. The court thus objected not only to
the general substantive rule of American Potash, but also to the exception which con-
tinued the National Tube policy in the aluminum, unit milling, steel, and lumber in-
dustries. The court observed that this exception is subject to independent attack because
all future cases involving the National Tube industries will be determined solely on
the basis of prior Board determinations—a clear violation of the mandate of section
9(b). Id. at 175, 44 L.R.R.M. at 2861.
See also Royal McBee Corp. v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 330, 50 L.R.R.M. 2158 (4th Cir.
1962), in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals again refused to enforce a Board
order on the ground that the Board's severance policies were arbitrary and discriminatory.
Id. at 332, 50 L.R.R.M. at 2160.
29
 See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 885, 886 n.3 (1960). How-
ever, a short time after the decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Member Fanning did call
for a review of the Board's severance policies. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, Uranium Div.,
129 N.L.R.B. 312, 315 n.3, 46 L.R.R.M. 1539, 1540 n.3 (1960).
30 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 4 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
81 Id. at 396-97, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1015-16.
82 Id. at 389, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1012.
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tests, the Board determined that the instrument mechanics were skilled
workmen with identifiable interests and thus constituted a "true craft
group."38 The Board, however, found that the second of the American
Potash tests was not met, for the petitioner did not qualify as a tradi-
tional representative of this particular craft.' At this point the Board
could have dismissed the petition on the ground that the second
American Potash standard was not met. Rejecting this approach, the
majority stated that a mere failure to show that the petitioner was a
traditional representative of the craft group was not sufficient, in and of
itself, to constitute a ground for dismissal."
Examining the historical development of the craft severance rules,
the Board reasoned that the American Potash decision neglected to
consider "all the relevant factors" and, as a result, only the desires
of the craftsmen were being considered." Recognizing the impropriety
of this, the majority commented:
Underlying [craft severance] determinations is the need to
balance the interest of the employer and the total employee
complement in maintaining the industrial stability and result-
ing benefits of an historical plant wide bargaining unit as
against the interest of a portion of such complement in having
an opportunity to break away from the historical unit by a
vote for separate representation. 37
After once again reviewing section 9 (b) (2 ) and concluding that the
legislature intended to give the Board broad discretion, the majority
rejected the American Potash doctrine, admitting that it had prevented
the Board from "discharging its statutory responsibility to make its
unit determinations on the basis of all relevant factors, including those
factors which weigh against severance."38 Furthermore, the Board
continued, the decision in American Potash created an arbitrary dis-
tinction between industries by continuing the National Tube policy in
certain favored industries while rejecting it in other integrated in-
dustries."
The majority in Mallinckrodt specifically overruled both Ameri-
can Potash and National Tube to the extent that those cases granted
or denied craft severance without considering all relevant factors.
The new approach outlined in Mallinckrodt involves an examination
33 Id. at 390, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1013.
84 Id. at 391, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1013.
85 Id.
36 Id. at 396, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
37 Id. at 392, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1014.
38 Id. at 396, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
38 Id.
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of all relevant "areas of inquiry" including, but not limited to, the
following:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct
and homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen
performing the functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive
basis, or of employees constituting a functionally distinct
department, working in trades or occupations for which a
tradition of separate representation exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees
sought at the plant involved, and at other plants of the em-
ployer, with emphasis on whether the existing patterns of
bargaining are productive of stability in labor relations, and
whether such stability will be unduly disrupted by the de-
struction of the existing patterns of representation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit
have established and maintained their separate identity dur-
ing the period of inclusion in a broader unit, and the extent
of their participation or lack of participation in the establish-
ment and maintenance of the existing pattern of representa-
tion and the prior opportunities, if any, afforded them to
obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the
industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production
processes, including the extent to which the continued normal
operation of the production processes is dependent upon the
performance of the assigned functions of the employees in
the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out"
a separate unit, including that union's experience in rep-
resenting employees like those involved in the severance
action."
The Board applied these new standards to the facts of the case,
and concluded that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by
allowing the petitioner to "carve out" a separate bargaining unit 4i
The majority based its dismissal of the petition on: (1) the intimate
relationship between the work of the instrument mechanics and the
production process, that is, the high degree of functional integration;"
(2) the twenty-five year history of bargaining, including the fact that
the record demonstrated that the incumbent union had provided ade-
40
 Id. at 397, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
41 Id. at 398, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1017.
42 Id.
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quate representation for the craftsmen;" and (3) the importance of
labor relations stability in an industry vital to the country's national
defense."
Member Fanning's dissent, as did the majority opinion, reviewed
section 9(b) (2) and its legislative history. However, he disagreed both
with the standards adopted by the majority and the application of
those standards. He concluded that Congress intended the Board to
accord identical treatment to both the severance and the initial organ-
ization of craft units," and he minimized the importance of a history
of plantwide bargaining." In addition, he found that section 9 (b) (2)
created a presumption in favor of craft representation in a severance
petition.'"
Member Fanning then proposed a different set of standards to be
used in deciding craft severance cases. First, with respect to the rele-
vance of a successful history of collective bargaining, he agreed that
severance should be denied where there is a showing that the interests
of the craft and industrial employees have been merged, or, alterna-
tively, that the pattern of representation in the rest of the industry has
been one of plantwide rather than craft representation." However,
he then qualified this rule by stating that he would
nevertheless, permit such separate representation where it is
necessary to free a small group of skilled craftsmen from a
bargaining structure in which, because of their minority
position, their legitimate special interests have been subor-
dinated to the interests of the majority of unskilled em-
ployees."
Thus, in his view a stable history of collective bargaining is of only
minor importance in determining the propriety of a requested craft
severance.
Second, with respect to functional integration Member Fanning
disagreed with the majority of the Board. He noted that although the
presence of a highly integrated production system would not "neces-
sarily" destroy the right of skilled employees to seek representation in
a separate unit it would, in fact, tend to dissipate the separate identity
of craft employees." It would appear that while he would not disregard
43 Id. at 399, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1017.
44 Id. at 398, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1017.
45 Id. at 402, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1019.







the nature of the particular production process, he would require a
higher degree of integration before denying severance than would the
majority.
Finally, Member Fanning concurred in the remaining "standards"
adopted by the majority. He observed that the majority included the
American Potash standards within the Mallinckrodt test—that the
employees constitute true craftsmen, and that the petitioning union be
a "traditional representative" of such employees—and that these stan-
dards would weigh in favor of severance though no longer conclus-
ively." In addition, he agreed that consideration should be given to
any attempts made by the craft employees to maintain their separate
identity despite their inclusion in the broader unit, including considera-
tion of the past opportunities, if any, which have been afforded them
to obtain separate representation. 52
Applying these standards to the facts in Mallinckrodt, Member
Fanning found that the three grounds set forth in the majority's
opinion were not sufficient to justify a dismissal of the petition. He
rejected the argument that the integration of the employer's operations
had merged the interests of the skilled and unskilled employees and
had thus destroyed the separate identity of the craft." He further
contended that the majority's conclusion would be inconsistent with
the E.I. duPont de Nemours case" decided that same day in which
the majority granted a self-determination election despite an operation
which allegedly was more highly integrated than that in Mallinck-
rodt." With respect to the bargaining history and labor stability argu-
ments, he indicated that an examination of the company's history
revealed that in three prior instances separate units had been carved
out from the production and maintenance unit, and that such multi-
unit bargaining had not been disruptive of labor stability." Con-
sequently, he concluded that section 9 (b) (2) required the Board
under these circumstances to grant a self-determination election to
the skilled craftsmen."
While both opinions advance a policy of flexibility in order to
compromise the diverse employee interests, the majority has implicitly
demonstrated a partiality toward the more comprehensive unit (and,
thus, industrial employees) whereas Member Fanning favors separate
representation (and, thus, craft employees).
51 Id. at 403-04, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1019.
52 Id. at 404, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1019.
53 Id. at 406, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1021.
54 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 413, 64 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1966).
55 162 N.L.R.B. at 405-06, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1020-21.
5° Id. at 405, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1020.
57 Id. at 407, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1021.
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III. THE Mallinckrodt DOCTRINE APPLIED
In applying the principles established in Mallinckrodt, the NLRB
has followed a discernible pattern; a majority of the Board has con-
tinually placed heavy reliance upon the existence of a long history of
industry-wide or plant-wide collective bargaining. 58 It is submitted that
this reliance has caused the NLRB to grant or deny severance on the
same "stable history of bargaining" criterion utilized in American
Can.59 Member Fanning's persistent opposition to this trend has en-
gendered a series of four-to-one splits which commenced with Holm-
berg, Inc.,°° decided on the same day as Mallinckrodt.
Professing to apply the new Mallinckrodt standards, the majority
in Holmberg based its denial of severance upon two findings: first,
that the craft group shared a substantial community of interests with
the other employees" and, second, that the twenty-four year history
of stable bargaining demonstrated that the craft group had been
adequately represented." Member Fanning attacked the finding of a
community of interests by marshalling several facts indicating the
weakness of that common bond. He noted that the petitioning em-
ployees worked in a separate location under separate supervision and
spent 80 percent of their time performing skilled functions. 03 He
stressed the differences in wage rates and contractual provisions and
accused the majority of ignoring these factors while giving undue
weight to those working conditions and benefits which were similar
for both the craft group and other employees." Having refuted the
finding of a community of interests, he concluded that "an examination
of [the Mallinckrodt] standards and their application to the facts
herein reveal that, in fact, conclusive weight is being given to the
broader bargaining history." 05
This pattern was repeated with little variation in the subsequent
59 See, e.g., McCord Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 67 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1968) ; Aerojet-
General Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 64 L.R.R.M. 1427 (1967) ; American Bosch
Arma Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 64 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1967), wherein the requested
severances of toolroom employees were all denied. See also Allied Chem. Corp., 165
N.L.R.B. No, 23, 65 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1967), wherein the Board in a four-to-one decision
(Member Fanning dissenting) denied severance to a unit of carpenters; and Jordan
Marsh Co., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 187, 70 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1969), wherein severance was
denied to a unit of bakers.
59 See generally Note, Unit Determination and the Problem of Craft Severance,
19 W. Res. L. Rev. 326 (1968) ; 8 B.C. hid. & Corn. L, Rev, 988 (1967).
60 162 N.L.R.B. 407, 64 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1966).
61 Id. at 409, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1026.
62 Id. at 410, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1026.
69 Id. at 411, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
04 Id. at 412, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1027-28.
05 Id. at 412, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
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cases of Lear-Siegler, Inc." and Mobil Oil Corp." In Mobil, Member
Fanning found the majority's denial of severance inconsistent with an
objective application of Mallinckrodt to the facts, and determined that
the majority's emphasis on functional integration and a long and stable
bargaining history had betrayed its lack of objectivity." He noted that
the majority's continued emphasis on functional integration would ef-
fectively deny to any employees engaged in a supporting function the
right to separate representation, and that the effect would be to
virtually eliminate bargaining by plant "subdivision," despite the
mandate of section 9 (b) (2)." The majority responded to this charge
by specifically disclaiming any implication that it was establishing a
presumption against the appropriateness of plant subdivision units,"
and cited two cases in which severance had been awarded to such
units."
In his dissent in Mobil, Member Fanning further denounced the
presumption that the mere presence of a history of industry or plant-
wide bargaining is indicative of adequate representation and stable
industrial relations. He questioned whether those groups traditionally
granted separate representation would now be required to show overt
protest actions against the larger unit in order to qualify for separate
representation." Instead of the adequacy of representation being
determined by Board fiat, he advocated that the craft group be per-
mitted to express by vote its reaction to representation by the larger
unit." Thus, in effect, he would eliminate the second area of inquiry
of the Mallinckrodt doctrine—consideration of the history of collective
bargaining. It appears that he would order an election in any case
where the proposed unit had demonstrated that application of at least
one of the six Mallinckrodt tests would weigh in favor of severance.
This would be a clear abdication of the Board's responsibility to de-
termine the appropriate unit and would result in many of the same
problems which existed under the American Potash rule.
66 170 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 67 L.R.R.M. 1522 (1968).
07
 169 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 67 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1968). See also cases cited at note 58
supra.
68 169 N.L.R.B. No. 35 at 11, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
613
 Id. at 10 n.13, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1157 n.13
In Dundee Cement Co., 170 N.L.B.R. No. 66, 67 L.R.R.M. 1409 (1966), Member
Fanning again made reference to his colleagues' disregard of § 9(b) of the Ad:
If [§ 9(b)] ... is now to be ignored on initial organization, there is ample
precedent to suggest it is even less likely to be adhered to by this Board in the
disposition of subsequent representation issues.
Id. at 15, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1414.
70 169 N.L.R.B. No. 35 at 7, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1156.
77 See Buddy L Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 66 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1968); Mesta
Mach. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 66 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1967).
72 169 N.L.R.B. No. 35 at 10-11, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
73 Id. at 11, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
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As the Board continued to apply the principles enunciated in
Mallinckrodt, the importance of the bargaining history factor became
more apparent, and in Radio Corp. of America' the petitioning group
attempted to circumvent that factor. The Board dismissed a petition for
severance citing as one ground the long history of stable bargaining."
The petitioner had attempted to overcome this point by arguing that
since the broader unit had contained both guards and non-guards—a
situation prohibited by Section 9(b) (3) of the Act—the overall
production and maintenance unit was inappropriate." Accordingly,
it was advanced, there was really no history of bargaining which the
Board could consider in applying the principles of Mallinckrodt."
The panel, however, rejected this argument, holding that it was un-
necessary to pass upon the appropriateness of the existing unit. The
Board reasoned:
One of the factors that Mallinckrodt requires us to con-
sider is the history of collective bargaining, with emphasis on
whether the existing patterns of bargaining are productive of
stability in labor relations. In considering the bargaining
history, we are not determining the appropriateness of the
existing unit, as that question is not in issue. . . . Rather, we
are merely passing upon a petition to grant a craft unit and,
in doing so, we are considering the history of amicable bar-
gaining in the larger unit as a factor showing stability in the
present situation, as opposed to what the labor relations
outlook might be if severance were granted."
The Board's position would appear to be defensible; again, accept-
ing labor relations stability as a primary objective in determining a
craft severance case, the existing unit should be examined only to
determine its effect on the total labor relations environment.
The opinions of the NLRB in those cases where craft representa-
tion has been denied profess to observe the principles and policies of
Mallinckrodt.. However, those decisions consistently raise doubt as to
whether these principles and policies are being applied in an objective
fashion. Even those cases where the Board has granted separate
representation do not signify a departure from the Board's subjective
application of the six Mallinckrodt tests. Those cases since Mal-
linckrodt in which a craft unit has been deemed appropriate by the
74 173 N.L.R,B. No. 72, 69 L.R.R.M. 1368 (1968).




 Id. at 13-14, 69 L.R.R.M. at 1373. It was also noted that the Act only prohibits
the Board from finding a mixed unit of guards and non-guards, but does not prevent the
parties from consenting to such a unit. Id.
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Board may be divided into two categories: first, those which involve
the initial organization of a craft unit not previously represented in
collective bargaining, and to which a more liberal rule has been applied
and, second, those in which the craft employees were members of a
broader unit but were not actually represented by that unit.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co." was the first of the cases involv-
ing initial organization. When compared with its companion case,
Holmberg, duPont demonstrates that separate representation in the
context of initial organization is more readily permitted than sever-
ance from an existing broad unit because generally it is less dis-
ruptive of industrial harmony. In duPont the Board found a high
degree of functional integration: the employer's operation consisted
of a continuous flow process; the craft employees spent more than 90
percent of their time in production areas, and their work was co-
ordinated with that of the production operators." Notwithstanding
these findings, the majority concluded that this functional integration,
where there were no "other considerations of . . . overriding force," 8 '
had not resulted in a merger of the separate community of interests:
[Functional integration] is not in and of itself sufficient
to preclude the formation of a separate craft bargaining unit,
unless it results in such a fusion of functions, skills, and
working conditions between those in the asserted craft group
and others outside it as to obliterate any meaningful lines
of separate craft identity."
In a concurring opinion Member Fanning reiterated his accusation
that in this initial organization case, as in severance cases, conclusive
weight was being given to the bargaining history factor. He agreed
with the majority "except to the extent that it relies on the absence
of bargaining history on a more comprehensive basis as a reason for
finding that the [craft employees] constitute a unit appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.fB' The similarity of the facts in duPont and Mallinckrodt
makes it difficult to reconcile the disparate results. The fact that
the craft unit was approved in duPont—which is distinguishable
79 162 . N.L.R.B. 413, 64 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1966). See also Mesta Mach. Co., 167
N.L.R.B. No. 10, 66 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1967) ; Fremont Hotel, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 23,
66 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1967) ; Myers Drum Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 65 L.R.R.M. 1454
(1967), where the Board, in granting separate self-determination elections, placed great
emphasis upon the fact that the requested employees had been previously unrepresented.
80 162 N.L.R.B. at 416-17, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1023.
81 Id at 419, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1024. It appears that the only "consideration" which
the Board would have deemed of "overriding force" was a history of collective bar-
gaining. Id. at 418, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1024.
82 Id. at 419, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1024.
83 Id. at 421, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1025.
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from Mallinckrodt only in the total absence of prior bargaining history
—lends considerable support to the opinion expressed by Member
Fanning. -
Although the case of Anheuser-Busch, Inc." is frequently con-
sidered to represent the granting of a ,severance petition, it is in fact
a case involving initial organization. Notwithstanding several factors
which weighed heavily against separate representation, the NLRB
granted the separate unit emphasizing that there was no relevant
history of collective bargaining because the electrical maintenance
department had been established subsequent to the last collective
bargaining agreement, and the electricians had not participated in that
agreement." Thus, the Board stated that it viewed "the situation .. .
as the initial establishment of a unit rather than a case of severance
from a traditional unit."' A comparison of this case with the earlier
Square D Co." case indicates that the Board gave conclusive weight
to the bargaining history factor in Anheuser-Busch. Separate repre-
sentation was denied in Square D on facts indistinguishable from those
in Anheuser-Busch except for a thirteen-year bargaining history.
Another case which has been considered a severance case but
which more closely resembles initial organization is Safeway Stores,
Inc.88
 There, a unit of bakers was severed from a larger unit of retail
clerks. The Board noted that, although the craft group had been fully
represented by the broader unit, the employer in 1963 had reorganized
the bakery department by assigning to the bakers new responsibilities
which were typical of the skilled bakers' trade." The Board also found
that the proposed craft unit had a separate community of interest by
emphasizing (1) the different working hours, 99
 (2) the separate and
distinct lines of seniority," and (3) the lack of interchangeability of
employees between the bakery and the rest of the store. 92 The Board
concluded that "the bargaining history of the [bakers'] inclusion
in the broader unit [did] not militate against their severance, par-
ticularly in view of the recent changes in the employer's method of
baking, and the changed job requirements."" (Emphasis added.) It
84 170 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 67 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1968).
85 Id. at 4, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1377.
86
 Id. The Board further noted that "while not controlling in a non-severance sit-
uation, the Mallinckrodt tests are useful" in initial organization cases. Id.
87 169 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 67 L.R.R.M. 1336 (1968).
88 178 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 72 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1969).
89 Id. at 4, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1134.
90 Id. at 5, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 4-5, 72 L.R.R.M. 1135.
03 Id. at 6, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
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appears that, absent the drastic job reorganization, the Board would
have denied severance relying upon the bargaining history factor."
Two additional facts were offered in order to rationalize the
Board's apparent change in policy. First, a consideration of conditions
in the rest of the "industry" demonstrated that other retail super-
markets in the geographical area had entered into contracts with the
petitioning union covering instore bakers, and that affiliates of the
petitioning union represented bakers in other Safeway stores located
elsewhere." Second, an examination of conditions within the local unit
revealed that labor relations stability had not been disrupted by
separate representation for meat cutters in the same stores."
It is submitted that the rationale advanced in Safeway would not
be applied by the Board to industries unlike the retail grocery business.
In manufacturing industries the fragmentation of bargaining units
produces the corresponding likelihood of a "double strike" situation,
where the separate craft unit, because of the skill of its members and
the essential nature of their work, has the economic power to shut
down the entire production operation. It is suggested that such power
would not accrue to the unit of bakers severed in Safeway. Thus,
severance might be conducive to immediate industrial peace without
causing future economic harm to the employer.
The second category includes cases in which actual severance from
an existing broader unit was permitted principally because the craft
employees were not in fact represented by that unit. In Jay Kay Metal
Specialties Corp.," the Board noted that, although the craft group
previously had been included in an overall production and maintenance
unit, the collective bargaining agreements had permitted the employer
to negotiate individually with the craft employees regarding job
classifications, wage rates and other conditions of employment. It was
found that in fact such individual negotiations had occurred." Thus,
the Board concluded that the craftsmen had maintained their separate
community of interest."
In Buddy L Corp."' severance was granted where the history of
bargaining demonstrated that, although the craft group was ostensibly
a part of the broader unit, it had not participated for the previous four
94 Cf. Buckeye Village Mkt., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 70 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1969),
where a 22-month bargaining history was considered "substantial, if not controlling, in
determining the appropriate unit." Id. at 5, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1531.
95
 178 N.L.R.B. No. 64 at 5-6, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
98 Id.
97 163 N.L.B.R. 719, 64 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1967).
98 Id. at 720-21, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1427.
99
 Id. at 721, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1427.
100 167 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 66 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1967).
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years in any collective bargaining negotiations."' In fact, the craft
employees had dealt directly with management concerning grievances
rather than utilizing the contractual grievance procedure.'" This
separate community of interests was reinforced by findings that the
employees constituted a true craft group,'" that their work was func-
tionally distinct from production work,' and that the petitioning union
was a traditional representative of such employees.'" The history of
industry and plant bargaining was considered, but the evidence was
found to be inconclusive; thus, because it could not be determined
that severance would disturb the stability of industry labor relations,
it was felt that "to deny separate representation where to do so ad-
vances the cause of stability little, if at all, might also carry the seeds
of instability."'
IV. THE National Tube INDUSTRIES AFTER Mallinckrodt
During the period when the Board adhered closely to the National
Tube doctrine, 107 the NLRB created what became known as the four
"favored industries," principally because of their immunity from the
rule of American Potash.'" However, with the adoption of the Mal-
linckrodt principles, the Board stated that in future craft severance
cases it would show no preference for or against severance, that all
relevant factors would be considered, and that all industries would be
treated equally. Since that time the Board has had occasion to re-
examine only two of the four favored industries, lumber and al-
uminum. A review of those cases indicates that the vestiges of earlier
special treatment still persist, and that the Board has still placed heavy
reliance upon the industry history of bargaining.
All three of the petitions for separate representation which have
arisen in the lumber industry have been dismissed by the Board. In
Timber Products Co.,H° the Board noted that the "integration of
operations" theory of National Tube and Weyerhaeuser Timber.'" had
been relegated by Mallinckrodt to being "but one relevant factor
in determining the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a proposed
unit, regardless of the industry involved."' The denial of separate
101
 Id. at 5, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1151.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1150.
1°4 Id. at 4, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1151.
108 Id. at 3, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1150-51.
108 Id. at 6, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1151-52.
107 See p. 415 supra.
108
 See pp. 415-17 supra.
108
 164 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 65 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1967).
110 See note 21 supra.
111 164 N.L.R.B. No. 109 at 9, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1189-90.
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representation in Timber Products appears to rest principally upon the
finding that the requested employees did not constitute a true craft
group but were merely "specialized workmen.' However, the Board
noted that, although there was no history of bargaining at Timber
Products' plant, the pattern of bargaining in the lumber industry has
been on a plant-wide rather than a craft basis, and has been conducive
to labor relations stability."3 The implication is clear that even had
the employees been deemed a true craft group, their case would not
have been viewed as other initial organization cases. Rather, because
in the majority's view functional integration is common to all lumber
industry operations, the industry pattern of bargaining would probably
control. In his dissent Member Fanning rightly commented that "the
result reached by the majority herein is dictated more by consideration
of the history of bargaining in this industry than by a consideration of
whether these employees qualify as craftsmen under our recent Mal-
linckrodt and duPont decisions." 114 He pointed out that the craft
qualifications of the electricians found here to be mere specialists were
comparable to those of the electricians in duPont who bad been granted
a self-determination election."'
Apparently, the majority were aware of this inherent inconsistency
as they felt compelled to offer assurances that the dismissal of this
petition should not be construed as foreclosing separate representa-
tion in the initial establishment of "appropriate" craft units in the
lumber industry."" These assurances were an attempt to respond to
Member Fanning's criticism:
[V]iewing this denial of a craft unit on initial organization
in conjunction with the recent Mallinckrodt decision, with its
emphasis on prior bargaining history whenever severance
is requested, it seems quite unlikely that a unit of main-
tenance electricians has any possibility of being found ap-
propriate at this plant at any future time. This type of craft
employee, foreclosed generally "in lumber" from separate
representation during the 18-year sway of Weyerhaeuser,
is still foreclosed despite the apparent demise of Weyer-
haeuser.'"
In the second lumber industry case, Potlatch Forests, Inc.," 8 a
Board panel dismissed a petition for separate representation, again
112 Id. at 10, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1190.
113 Id. at 9, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1189-90.
114 Id. at 17, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1193.
115 Id. at 12, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
115 Id. at 11 n.16, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1190 n.16.
117 Id. at 16, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1192-93.
In 165 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 65 L.R.R.M. 1454 (1967).
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finding that the employees were specialists and not craftsmen. The
Board found that the multi-plant bargaining agreement did not apply
to the new plant where the requested employees worked. Thus, the
panel impliedly conceded that this was a case of initial organization,
but, unlike Timber Products, relied entirely upon the finding that the
employees were specialists. The panel did not allude to the industry
pattern of bargaining, but their failure to do so should not be inter-
preted as a change in policy, for it appears that the craft qualifications
of the employees in Potlatch were considerably weaker than those of
the employees in Timber Products. Thus, it was unnecessary for the
Board to place reliance upon the industry pattern of bargaining in
order to support dismissal of the petition.
In United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.,"° the most
recent of the three lumber industry cases, the "specialist" approach
was inapplicable as the employees did not claim to constitute a craft
unit but, rather, sought severance as a departmental unit.' 2° Dismissal
was based in part upon a merger of community of interests brought
about by a history of common supervision, functional integration,
similarity of work, and transferability of employees among depart-
ments."' As in Timber Products, the industry history of bargaining
appears to have been controlling even though there was found to be
no relevant plant-wide history of bargaining because bargaining had
been suspended during the preceding seven years. 122 The majority
noted
that the employer is engaged at least in substantial part in
the basic lumber industry. This industry has historically
bargained on a plant-wide basis, which has been conducive
to a substantial degree of stability in labor relations, and this
background was a substantial reason for the rule announced
in Weyerhaeuser Co. We no longer adhere to the Weyer-
haeuser doctrine, but determine the appropriateness of units
in this industry based on the same factors as any other type of
enterprise. However, the integrated nature of the operations
as well as the industry bargaining pattern and stability which
were the underlying reasons for the Weyerhaeuser decision
remain valid factors to be considered and weighed in making
unit findings, even though they were not sufficient in and of
no 174 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 70 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1969).
120 Id. at 2, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1163.
121 Id. at 12, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1166-67.
122 Id. at 10, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
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themselves to preclude consideration of other relevant fac-
tors.'"
The decisions in Timber Products, Potlatch Forests and United
States Plywood-Champion raise doubt as to the Board's application of
the principles established in Mallinckrodt. The National Tube doctrine
created a pattern of integrated unit collective bargaining in the lumber
industry. Mallinckrodt specifically rejected that doctrine. The NLRB,
however, despite its pronouncements to the contrary has continued to
rely upon this "established pattern of bargaining" to deny both the
severance and the initial organization of craft units in the lumber
industry.
Only one case has arisen in the aluminum industry since the
adoption of the Mallinckrodt standards. In Alcan Aluminum Corp.124
the Board dismissed a request for a unit of maintenance employees and
granted one for an overall production and maintenance unit.'" In
so ruling the majority presented a detailed factual analysis to sub-
stantiate its finding that the employer's operations were highly in-
tegrated.'" As in two of the lumber cases, reference was made to the
fact that while Mallinckrodt overruled National Tube, the integrated
nature of the employer's operations and the pattern of bargaining in
the industry were still relevant considerations in making unit deter-
minations.' 27
In his dissent Member Fanning commented that the majority's
decision left craft and maintenance employees in the aluminum in-
dustry in the same position as before Mallinckrodt:
[The Mallinckrodt] decision in significant part dealt with a
promised end to plantwide unit guarantees in four basic
industries. My colleagues subscribed to this principle, but
they have now effectively negated application of it in the
aluminum industry, just as their Timber Products decision
. . . did in the lumber industry.'"
123 Id. at 10-11, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
Two members dissented on the basis that the facts were indistinguishable from those
presented in the earlier case of Crown Simpson Pulp Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 64
L.R.R.M. 1409 (1967), where a self-determination election had been granted to the
maintenance department employees of a pulp mill operation. 174 N.L.R.B. No. 48 at
17-18, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1168.
124 178 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 72 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1969).
125 Id. at 11, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
125 Id. at 1-10, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1098-1101.
127 Id. at 10, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1101.
128 Id. at 13, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1102.
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CONCLUSION
The decision of the NLRB in Mallinckrodt was an admirable
attempt to achieve an optimal compromise solution to the craft unit
dilemma. The pronouncements therein represented the successful cul-
mination of a history of unsuccessful craft unit policies. The principles
established by the Board in Mallinckrodt are to be commended. How-
ever, subsequent application of those principles reveals that, in reality,
the standards set forth in Mallinckrodt have been used not to reach
a conclusion, but rather to support one. For example, in the lumber
industry cases, the Board placed heavy reliance upon the high degree
of functional integration. But in the duPont case, where there was an
equal degree of integration, it "reasoned" that this factor was "not in
and of itself sufficient to preclude the formation of a separate craft
unit.' " 29 Such legerdemain makes irresistible the conclusion that "in
actual operation the decision to deny or grant separate representation
has frequently been used as the criterion to determine which factors
will be utilized and in what manner.'" 3°
Member Fanning's recurring criticism that his colleagues have con-
sistently given conclusive weight to the bargaining history factor also
has merit. The Board's craft unit determinations substantiate this
accusation. Of approximately thirty craft severance cases brought
before the Board, only three were won by the petitioning union, 13 ' and
these cases, Buddy L Corp., 132 Jay Kay Metal Specialties Corp.," and
Safeway Stores, Inc.,'" cannot be considered typical craft severance
cases for reasons explained earlier.
Member Fanning's accusations, however, represent an attack
merely upon the penumbra of the NLRB's craft severance policies.
The crux of the issue involves a choice between craft unionism and
industrial unionism. More specifically, the Board majority has weighed
the diverse interests of the skilled and unskilled employees along
with the interdependency of the bargaining power relationship and
has concluded that the few must sacrifice for the good of all.
Despite this favoritism, there is still much to be said in behalf of
the NLRB's craft unit determinations. Should the Board adopt a
policy of freely granting separate representation to craft employees,
it may well be sowing the seeds of labor relations instability. The
129 162 N.L.R.B. at 419, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1024.
139 Cohen, Two Years Under Mallinckrodt: A Review of the Board's Latest Craft
Unit Policy, 20 Lab. L.J. 195, 214 (1969).
131 It should be noted that a Board panel did grant one of three severance petitions
in National Cash Register, 168 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 67 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1967).
132 See pp. 427-28 supra.
133 Sec p. 427 supra.
134 See pp. 426-27 supra.
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members are clearly aware that a lenient policy toward severance of
craft employees from the larger comprehensive unit may undermine
the bargaining position of the majority of the firm's employees. The
recent experience of a large paper manufacturer is illustrative of the
disruption which unit fragmentation may create. The company's
production employees were represented by an industrial union while
the boiler room employees constituted a separate unit represented by
a different union. The collective bargaining agreement for the larger
unit expired on August 8. After several days of negotiation and a
brief strike, a new agreement was reached. On August 16 the agreement
with the boiler room employees expired and their representative in-
sisted upon higher benefits than had been given to the production
workers. The company now found itself between Scylla and Charybdis.
To accede to the union's demands would induce resentment and dis-
harmony among the production workers. However, to stand fast would
invite a strike and possible disruption of the entire production process.
Thus, a minority of employees successfully forced both the employer
and the full complement of production workers into a position from
which only the minority could benefit.
Although the NLRB's craft severance decisions have merited
Member Fanning's criticisms, the policy alternative he advocates is
pregnant with the seeds of industrial unrest. His opinions indicate an
attempt—despite protestations to the contrary—to apply a rigid rule
which would in nearly all cases lead to fragmentation of the bargain-
ing units. One need only examine the industrial relations problems of
the railway, maritime, newspaper and construction industries to ap-
preciate the unwholesome consequences of such fragmentation. Multi-
union bargaining in these industries has nourished inter-union rivalries,
disrupted the free flow of commerce and necessitated extensive govern-
ment intervention in the collective bargaining process. Congress surely
did not intend to foster such a chaotic and unstable relationship.
The decision in Mallinckrodt set forth principles capable of solv-
ing most of the craft severance issues. The missing factor is a formula
of unbiased, objective application of these principles. While the NLRB
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